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JUSTICE JACKSON AND THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION 
Paul A. Weidner* 
MUCH of the pattern of division in the present Supreme Court is traceable to basic differences of opinion regarding the proper 
role of a judge in the process of constitutional adjudication. Some 
students of the Court, yielding to the current fashion of reducing even 
intricate problems to capsule terms, have tried to explain the contro-
versy by classifying the justices as either "liberals" or "conservatives."1 
A second school poses the disagreement largely in terms of judicial 
"activism" as opposed to judicial "restraint." It is this view that has 
the greater relevance for the present discussion. C.H. Pritchett, one 
of the leading exponents of this view,2 says that the judicial activist 
"appears to experience a deep sense of personal responsibility for the 
immediate consequences of his judicial decisions."3 He feels that the 
Court has a range of discretion, that there are alternatives available to 
him, and that "he must make the choice which will give the right 
result."4 The activist does not pretend to exercise the power of judicial 
review in accordance with standards imposed by the legal system; he 
will apply formal legal concepts only if they assist him in reaching a 
desirable goal. On the present Court, Pritchett suggests, Justices Black 
and Douglas best reflect this "goal-orientation" of the activists.5 The 
proponents of judicial self-restraint see a justice at his best when he 
exercises the judicial power with restraint and prudence. This "func-
tionally-oriented" view sees the Court "not as crusader or advocate but 
as one of the instruments of political and social accommodation and 
adjustment in a complicated governmental system."6 Its stress "is not 
on securing a result conforming to the jurist's own scheme of values 
but upon adherence to appropriate judicial standards and proper ma-
nipulation of judicial techniques."7 Justice Frankfurter, Pritchett sub-
mits, is the modem leader of the restraint school, and his views are 
subjected to close scrutiny.8 
* Instructor in American Government and History, Henry Ford Community College, 
Dearborn, Michigan.-Ed. 
1 See, for example, McCUNE, THE NINB YoUNG MEN (1947). 
2 PRITCHE'IT, THE RoosEVELT CotmT, c. 10 (1948); and the same author's more 
recent CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE VINSON CotmT, cc. 10, 11 (1954). 
3 PRITCHE'IT, CIVIL LlBERTIES AND THE VINSON CotmT 198 (1954). 
4Jd. at 199. 
5Jd., c. 10. 
Gld. at 201. 
7Ibid. 
Sld., c. 11. 
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While Pritchett's approach is basically sound, it does have the 
effect of obscuring the constitutional views of Justice Robert H. Jack-
son, who often seems to be regarded as a mere intellectual appendage 
of Justice Frankfurter. In contrast to his elaborate analysis of Frank-
furter's conception of the judicial function, Pritchett, writing before 
Jackson's death,9 summarized Jackson's judicial philosophy only briefly 
and then concluded, "The unpredictability of Jackson's performance 
leads one to question whether he has developed any systematic theories 
about . . . the judicial function."1O This cursory conclusion suggests 
the need for a deeper penetration into the general writings and judicial 
opinions of Justice Jackson to discover if he had an integrated philoso-
phy concerning the judicial function, and to appraise the extent to 
which he was an advocate of judicial self-restraint. This study is an 
attempt to fill that need. Its intent is not to summarize Justice Jackson's 
political and judicial career; it is rather an inquiry into his conception 
of the judicial function as applied to certain basic types of review situa-
tions. If we can determine this, we may have the key that will enable 
us to interpret his Supreme Court experience. 
The Limitations on Judicial Review 
Shortly before his elevation to the Supreme Court in 1941, Jackson 
presented his conception of the proper role of the Supreme Court.11 
Those views reveal a general devotion to the theory of judicial self-
restraint. In describing the position of the Court in the American 
system of sep~ration of powers, Jackson said that the Court has no 
function except to decide "cases" and "controversies," and its very 
jurisdiction to do that was left largely to the control of Congress. It 
has, he continued, "no force to execute its own commands . . . . Its 
Justices derive their offices from the favor of the other two branches 
by appointment and confirmation, and hold them subject to an unde-
fined, unlimited, and unreviewable Congressional power of impeach-
ment."12 Given this vulnerable, dependent position, the Court should 
avoid overt clashes with the political branches whenever possible. This 
belief in the propriety of restraint was strengthened by the conviction 
that the Court is an institution of distinctive characteristics that tend to 
9 Jackson died in Washington on October 9, 1954, at the age of 62. 
10 PRITcHBTr, C!vi:L LrnBnTIEs AND nm VINSON CounT 228-229 (1954). At another 
point, Pritchett stated that "the rather erratic nature" of Jackson's opinions made it difficult 
to catalogue him. Id. at 18. 
11 JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (1941). 
12ra. at ix. 
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make it anti-democratic.13 To avert the external adoption of a formula 
for limiting judicial pretensions, Jackson would have the justices them-
selves work out a "corrected pattern of judicial restraint."14 To him, 
it was an awesome thing to strike down acts of the legislature, and 
deference to the Executive was as compelling as deference to the legis-
lature.15 To clinch his argument, Jackson contended that time has 
proved the judgment of the Court wrong "on the most outstanding 
issues upon which it has chosen to challenge the popular branches."16 
It was this set of conceptions that Robert Jackson brought to the Court. 
Jurisdictional Limitations. We can learn much of the philosophy 
of a justice by examining his attitude regarding the scope of the juris-
diction of the Court. The Constitution limits the judicial power to 
"cases" and "controversies,"17 and the rules developed by the Court in 
interpreting this limitation govern both the extent of the judicial power 
and the power of the federal courts to entertain jurisdiction.18 From 
the outset, the Court has held that it can act only when the subject is 
presented in a case, and a case arises only when there are adverse liti-
gants.10 The parties to the dispute must have a substantial interest, not 
merely the general interest of a citizen in government by law.20 It 
follows that jurisdiction will be taken only where the issue is real as 
opposed to abstract, contingent, hypothetical, or moot, and that the 
Court will not render advisory opinions. So runs the theory; but the 
generality of the terms permits some latitude in their application to 
specific cases. The loose interpretation given the terms by the activist 
widens the area of justiciable issues, while the stricter view taken by the 
advocate of restraint narrows the capacity of the Court to receive juris-
diction. 
Justice Jackson's attitude on this question of standing to sue was 
made clear in the series of cases where separation of church and state 
was at issue. In the first of these, Everson v. Board of Education, 21 
Jackson dissented but did not raise the issue of standing. In a later 
case, Jackson said that the Court had found a justiciable controversy in 
1s Id. at 311. 
14 Id. at vii. 
15 Id. at 323. 
16Id. at x. 
11 Art. III, §2. 
18 See CORWIN (ed.), THB CoNSTITOTION OF THB UNITED STATES oF AMERICA, S. 
Doc. 170, 82d Cong., 2d sess., p. 538 (1953). 
19 Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 737 (1824). See also 
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 31 S.Ct. 250 (1911). 
20 See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 43 S.Ct. 597 (1923). 
21330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 504 (1947). 
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the Everson case because Everson "showed a measurable appropriation 
or disbursement of school-district funds occasioned solely by the activi-
ties complained of."22 But what of a case where the expenditure of 
funds was more difficult to cull out from general disbursements? This 
question was presented in McCollum 11. Board of Education23 which 
involved the released-time program of religious instruction in the Cham-
paign, Illinois, public schools. In this program, public school children 
having parental consent attended classes in religious instruction during 
the school day and in school buildings. The interest asserted by Mrs. 
McCollum, who challenged the program, was that of a resident tax-
payer and of a parent whose child was enrolled at the time in the public 
schools. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Black ruled that Mrs. 
McCollum had sufficient standing to maintain the action. Jackson, in 
a concurring opinion, said that it was doubtful whether Mrs. McCollum 
as a taxpayer had shown any substantial property injury, since the cost 
of the program to the taxpayers was "incalculable and negligible." 
Two 1952 cases afford better insight into Jackson's ideas concerning 
standing to challenge constitutionality. In Doremus 11. Board of Educa-
tion24 the Court avoided a decision on the validity of a New Jersey 
statute providing for the reading, without comment, of Bible verses at 
the opening of each public-school day. Two plaintiffs sought a declara-
tory judgment that the statute violated the First Amendment establish-
ment of religion clause. Both claimed an interest as taxpayers and 
citizens, with one further alleging that he had a seventeen-year-old 
daughter in school. Before appeal was taken to the Supreme Court, 
however, the daughter had been graduated from the public schools. In 
speaking for a six-justice majority, Jackson held that the graduation of 
the daughter had rendered the claim of her parent a moot question. The 
Court, said Jackson, did not sit to "decide arguments after events have 
put them to rest:'' Moreover, the parent lacked substantial interest even 
before the question became moot, since there was no claim that the 
Bible-reading offended or injured the daughter. In disposing of the 
taxpayer's aspect of the case, Jackson ruled that a taxpayer's action can 
meet the test of a case or controversy "only when it is a good-faith 
pocketbook action." To Jackson, the case involved a religious difference, 
not a "direct dollars-and-cents injury." It was not enough that the 
plaintiff "suffers in some indefinite way in common with people gen-
22Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429 at 434, 72 S.Ct. 394 (1952). 
23 333 U.S. 203, 68 S.Ct. 461 (1948). 
24 342 U.S. 429, 72 S.Ct. 394 (1952). 
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erally."25 The appeal, therefore, was dismissed without reaching the 
constitutional question. The second case, Zorach v. Clauson,26 in-
volved New York City's released-time program, which differed from the 
Champaign plan in that the religious instruction was held outside the 
public schools. In this instance, however, the Court held that no 
problem of jurisdiction was posed, since the appellants were citizens 
and taxpayers and were parents of children currently attending schools 
subject to the released-time program.27 ln his dissenting opinion, Justice 
Jackson did not question this view. 
Thus it is apparent that Jackson, in dealing with the general area 
of cases and controversies, believed in the wisdom of the traditional 
cautionary rules dictated by the restraint philosophy.28 While few 
would object to the Court's refusal to render decisions on moot ques-
tions or to give advisory opinions, there are those who feel that the Court 
has been too zealous in applying the "pocketbook" test of standing to 
sue, especially when civil liberties are at issue.29 But Jackson's concern 
for jurisdictional limitations was not as great as that of Justice Frank-
furter, the ''keeper of the Court's jurisdictional conscience."30 In Adler 
v. Board of Education,31 for example, Jackson did not join Frankfurter's 
dissenting argument that the teachers and parents who attacked the 
New York Feinberg Law dealing with teacher loyalty lacked sufficient 
interest to warrant the Court's receiving jurisdiction. Frankfurter had 
also objected to the adjudication of claims before the statutory scheme 
had been set in motion. To him the issue was abstract and speculative, 
but Jackson apparently thought not.32 
25 Id. at 434, quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 at 488, 43 S.Ct. 597 
(1923). 
26 343 U.S. 306, 72 S.Ct. 679 (1952). 
27Jd. at 309, note 4. In Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 at 255, 67 S.Ct. 1552 
(1947), Jackson, quoting Brandeis, said: ''The Court will not pass upon the constitution-
ality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits." In Dixon 
v. Duffy, 344 U.S. 143 at 147, 73 S.Ct. 193 (1952), Jackson said in dissent, "Doubt of 
our jurisdiction is no justification for exercising it; quite the contrary is the rule." 
28 Speaking of advisory opinions, Jackson said that the Court "early and wisely deter-
mined that it would not give advisory opinions even when asked by the Chief Executive." 
Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103 at 113, 
68 S.Ct. 431 (1948). 
29 See Bischoff, "Status to Challenge Constitutionality," in CAHN, SUPREME CotmT 
AND SUPREME I.Aw 26 (1954). 
30 PRlTCHB'lT, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND nm VINSON COURT 220 (1954). 
31 342 U.S. 485, 72 S.Ct. 380 (1952). 
32 In Albertson v. Millard, 345 U.S. 242, 73 S.Ct. 600 (1953), Jackson and Frankfurter 
agreed that the Michigan Communist Control (Trucks) Act should not be reviewed 
because it had not yet been interpreted by the state courts. Although this case involved 
exhaustion of state remedies rather than standing to sue, it does illuminate Jackson's views 
on jurisdictional problems. 
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In keeping with the philosophy of self-restraint in assuming juris-
diction is the doctrine that the Court is by nature incompetent to decide 
questions of a "political" character. 33 While there are no simple defini-
tions of political questions, Corwin has supplied one that should prove 
satisfactory. They are questions, he says, "relating to the possession of 
political power, of sovereignty, of government, the determination of 
which is vested in Congress and the President whose decisions are 
conclusive upon the courts."34 In each of the important political ques-
tions cases in which he participated,35 Jackson put himself on the side 
of restraint by refusing to evaluate decisions of the political branches of 
government. 
In Chicago and Southern Air Lines, Inc. 11. Waterman Steamship 
Corp.36 the issue was whether orders of the Civil Aeronautics Board 
which grant or deny applications to engage in foreign air transportation 
were reviewable by the courts. The Civil Aeronautics Act prqvides that 
such orders are subject to the approval of the President. Speaking for 
a five-justice majority, Jackson said that, in the past, the courts have 
refused the opportunity to enlarge their jurisdiction by "self-denying 
constructions" which exempt from judicial control orders which, "from 
their nature, from the context of the Act, or from the relation of judicial 
power to the subject-matter, are inappropriate for review." In his view, 
"the very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is 
political, not judicial. Such decisions are wholly confided by our 
Constitution to the political departments of government, Executive 
and legislative. They are delicate, complex, and involve large 
elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only 
by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they 
advance or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the 
Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and 
which has long been held to belong in the domain of political 
power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry."37 
That the termination of wars is a political question is a principle of long 
standing,38 and in 1948, in Ludecke 11. Watkins,39 the Court reiterated 
33 See Frank, "Political Questions," in CAHN, SUl'REME COURT .AND SUl'REME LAw 
36 (1954). 
34CoRWIN, THB CoNSTITOTION oF THI! UNITED STATES oF AMERICA, S. Doc. 170, 
82d Cong., 2d sess., p. 547 (1953). 
35 Jackson did not participate in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 66 S.Ct. 1198 
(1946), or in In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 66 S.Ct. 340 (1946). 
36 333 U.S. 103, 68 S.Ct. 431 (1948). 
37ld. at 111. 
38 See Commercial Trust Co. of New Jersey v. Miller, 262 U.S. 51, 43 S.Ct. 486 
(1923). 
39 335 U.S. 160, 68 S.Ct. 1429 (1948). 
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that rule. Under a law of Congress, the President, through the at-
torney general, was given power to deport enemy aliens in time of war 
without judicial review. Although the Ludecke case arose three years 
after the cessation of hostilities with Germany, the :live-justice majority, 
Jackson included, held that the determination of the cessation of a state 
of war was a question for the political branches, not the courts, to decide. 
In South 11. Peters,40 in a per curiam opinion (Black and Douglas dis-
senting), the Court ruled that the validity of Georgia's county-unit vote 
system for nominating candidates in primaries was a political question. 
By this holding the Court evaded the difficult question of whether the 
system denied equal protection of the laws to voters in the more popu-
lous counties. 
The 1952 case of Harisiades 11. Shaughnessy41 affords deeper in-
sight into Jackson's views on political questions. Here the Court was 
asked to decide whether the government may deport an alien because 
of Communist Party membership which terminated prior to the passage 
of the statute which authorized such deportation.42 In his opinion for 
the majority, Jackson said that any policy toward aliens "is vitally and 
intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the 
conduct of foreign relations. . . ." Such matters are "so exclusively 
entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely im-
mune from judicial inquiry or interference." It was "not necessary and 
probably not possible to delineate a fixed and precise line of separation" 
between political and judicial power, but Jackson saw nothing in the 
Constitution that would require the Court to equate its political 
judgment with that of Congress. Reform in the field of aliens had to be 
"entrusted to the branches of the Government in control of our inter-
national relations and treaty-making powers." 
Post-Jurisdictional Limitations. Once the Court has assumed juris-
diction in a case, the formal theory of self-restraint puts additional limita-
tions on the judicial power.43 One of these requires that the Court 
decide the constitutional issues presented only if "strict necessity" de-
mands it. Before corning to the Court, Jackson called the avoidance of 
constitutional issues the "first principle of constitutional adjudication."44 
The Court, he said then, "has a philosophy that while it has a duty to 
40 339 U.S. 276, 70 S.Ct. 641 (1950). 
41 342 U.S. 580, 72 S.Ct. 512 (1952). 
42 The Alien Registration Act, 54 Stat. L. 670 (1940). 
48 The best formulation of these self-limitations is that of Justice Brandeis in his 
concurring opinion in Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297 U.S. 288, 56 S.Ct. 466 (1936). 
44 JACKSON, THB STRUGGLE I'OR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 114 (1941). 
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decide constitutional questions, it must escape the duty if possible."45 
In a recent case, Jackson revealed his consistent support of the doctrine 
of strict necessity, and explained why he regarded ·it a sound limitation. 
The relevant passage speaks for itself: 
"The principle is old and deeply imbedded in our jurispru-
dence that this Court will construe a statute in a manner that 
requires decision of serious constitutional questions only if the 
statutory language leaves no reasonable alternative. . . . This is 
not because we would avoid or postpone difficult decisions. The 
predominant consideration is that we should be sure Congress has 
intentionally put its power in issue by the legislation in question 
before we undertake a pronouncement which may have far-reach-
ing consequences upon the powers of the Congress or the powers 
reserved to the several states. To withhold passing upon an issue 
of power until we are certain it is knowingly precipitated will do 
no great injury, for Congress, once we have recognized the ques-
tion, can make its purpose explicit and thereby necessitate or avoid 
decision of the question."46 
A second precept of self-restraint requires that legislation be pre-
sumed constitutional unless shown otherwise beyond all reasonable 
doubt. Jackson early subscribed to this view of the judicial power 
when, in 1940, he declared that the power to strike down acts of Con-
gress was an awesome thing and that "power so uncontrolled is not to 
be used save where the occasion is clear beyond fair debate."47 That 
he did not depart from this basic position is evident again in the 1953 
case of United States v. Five Gambling Devices,48 where he said it was 
not a "mere polite gesture" for the Court to accord a strong presumption 
of constitutionality to acts of Congress. It was, he felt, a deference due 
to deliberate judgment of Congress that an act was within its power.49 
A further logical limitation on judicial review, in the past at least, 
has been a rather strict adherence to the principle of stare decisis, which 
45 Id. at 305. 
46 United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441 at 448-449, 74 S.Ct. 190 
(1953). See also United States v. Smith, 331 ·u.S. 469, 67 S.Ct. 1330 (1947). In United 
States v. C.I.O., 335 U.S. 106, 68 S.Ct. 1349 (1948), Jackson voted with the majority 
in upholding a Taft-Hartley Act provision that appeared to prohibit comment on national 
elections by newspapers :financially supported by unions. The majority avoided the consti-
tutional issue by holding that the provision was not intended to outlaw political comment 
by union newspapers, even though the act's legislative history suggested the opposite 
conclusion. 
47 JACKSON, THE STRUGGLll FOR JaDICIAL SaPRl!MACY 323 (1941). 
48346 U.S. 441, 74 S.Ct. 190 (1953). 
49 Jackson felt, however, that the presumption could have little practical force when 
congressional leaders, in managing a bill, ''have told Congress that the bill will not reach 
that which the act is invoked in this Court to cover." Id. at 449. 
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Jackson has defined as "the doctrine that a court will give a word or 
phrase in a contract or statute the same meaning tomorrow that it did 
yesterday, that it will resort to the same principles to fashion future 
judgments that it employed in past ones. . . . [I]n its absence . . . 
there is no law but that day's opinion of the judge who perhaps acci-
dentally gets the case."50 On the one hand, judicial respect for prece-
dent is a guarantee of stability and certainty in the law; on the other, 
refusal to break with precedent can place the law in a strait-jacket. The 
resulting conflict between the claims of stability and progress has been 
productive of much constitutional controversy. 
In a discussion of stare decisis before his elevation to the Court, 
Jackson said that he would like to see the Court overrule "offending 
precedents," that is, cases where the Court had caused unnecessary 
friction by translating its own economic philosophy into constitutional 
dogma.51 He emphasized, however, that stare decisis was so important 
that no lawyer or judge should depart from it lightly.52 Broadly speak-
ing, Jackson persisted in this view while on the Court. In the realm of 
constitutional construction, he accorded deep respect to the principle of 
stare decisis.53 When the Court, in the first of the Williams divorce 
cases,54 abandoned the 36-year old rule of Haddock v. Haddock,55 
Jackson protested. "This Court," he declared, "may follow precedents, 
irrespective of their merits, as a matter of obedience to the rule of stare 
decisis. Consistency and stability may be so served. They are ends 
desirable in themselves, for only thereby can the law be predictable to 
those who must shape their conduct by it and to lower courts which 
must apply it." But, he went on, the Court could break with established 
law, overrule precedents, and start a new cluster of leading cases to de-
fine what it meant, only as a matter of deliberate policy. And in such 
a break with precedent there should be some hint of "countervailing 
public good" to be served by a change. 
50 Jackson, "The Law Is a Rule for Men to Live By," 9 VrrAL SPEECHES 664 at 665 
(1943). 
51 JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JtrnICIAL SUPREMACY, xvii (1941). 
52Jd. at 314. 
53 In testimony given to the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1937, Jackson approved 
Justice Stone's dictum: ''The doctrine 0£ stare decisis, however appropriate and even nec-
essary at times, has only a limited application in the field 0£ constitutional law." REoRGANI-
ZATION OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary 0£ the 
United States Senate on S. 1392, 75th Cong., 1st sess., part I, p. 51 (1937). In evalu-
ating this statement, however, it should be kept in mind that Jackson was then speaking 
for the Justice Department, not as a Supreme Court justice. 
54Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 63 S.Ct. 207 (1942). 
55 201 U.S. 562, 26 S.Ct. 525 (1906). 
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In like fashion, Jackson dissented in the South-Eastern Underwriters 
case56 in 1944, when the Court upset a 75-year old holding that the 
business of insurance could not be regulated by Congress under the 
commerce power.57 Were the Court considering the question for the 
first time, Jackson argued, he would have "no misgivings about holding 
that insurance business is commerce and where conducted across state 
lines is interstate commerce." As a matter of "fact" insurance is com-
merce, but for constitutional purposes a "£.ction" has been established 
that it is not. Therefore, the Court was duty bound to consider the 
practical consequences of its sharp revision in constitutional theory. 
Jackson concluded that to use his office "to dislocate the functions and 
revenues of the states and to catapult Congress into immediate and un-
divided responsibility for supervision of the nation's insurance busi-
nesses" was more than he could reconcile with his view of the function 
of the Court. 58 
The extent of Jackson's respect for stare decisis was again revealed 
in the Magnolia Petroleum Co. case,59 where Jackson concurred in the 
result even though it meant applying the rule of the Williams case 
which he had criticized the year before. In announcing his intention 
to abide by a rule he disliked, at least until it was taken off the books, 
Jackson said that overruling a precedent "always introduces some con-
fusion and the necessity for it may be unfortunate. But it is as nothing 
to keeping on our books utterances to which we ourselves will give full 
faith and credit only if the outcome pleases us."60 That he would be 
willing, however, to take part in overruling what he felt to be a wrong 
construction of the Constitution is best illustrated by his opinion for the 
Court in the second Hag-salute case, 61 where the Court reversed a de-
cision of only three years standing. 62 
For the most part, Jackson preferred a rigorous application of the 
principle of stare decisis in cases involving statutory interpretation. In 
56 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U.S. 533 at 586, 64 S.Ct. 
1162 (1944). 
57 Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. (75 U.S.) 168 (1869). 
58 Jackson suggested that, instead of overruling Paul v. Virginia, the Court could 
apply the principle, already applied in other fields, that, even if the business of insurance 
is not commerce, the antitrust laws could apply to the manipulation of insurance to restrain 
interstate commerce. 
59 Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 64 S.Ct. 208 (1943). 
Go Id. at 447. 
61 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178 
(1943). 
62Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 60 S.Ct. 1010 (1940). 
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Helvering 11. Griffiths,63 for example, he declared that "a long period of 
accommodations to an older decision sometimes requires us to adhere to 
an unsatisfactory rule to avoid unfortunate practical results from a 
change." On the other hand, where serious mistakes were made, Jackson 
would have the Court reverse. In United States 11. Bryan64 he said that 
the principle of stare decisis was only the "normal principle of judicial 
action," and that it was "not well served by failing to make explicit an 
overruling which is implicit in a later decision." It was, he said, em-
barrassing to confess a blunder, but it could be more embarrassing to 
adhere to it. 65 
These examples indicate that, like most jurists of our time, Jackson 
found it difficult to develop a consistently-applicable formula for decid-
ing between the con8.icting claims of stability and progress in the law. 
But the cases cited reveal his fundamental respect for the principle of 
stare decisis, and at the same time demonstrate his awareness that over-
emphasis on the principle would produce an intolerable rigidity in the 
law. He deplored a false consistency, and when faced with difficult 
situations he realistically weighed the practical consequences of a de-
cision to abandon a precedent. He seemed to feel that stability with 
progress in the law was not a contradiction in terms. In all probability, 
he would have endorsed Cardozo' s view that the "victory is not for the 
partisans of an inB.exible logic nor yet for the levelers of all rule and all 
precedent, but the victory is for those who shall know how to fuse 
these two tendencies together in adaptation to an end as yet imperfectly 
discerned."66 
In recent times, with the constitutionality of federal legislation in 
the economic realm all -but assured, the attention of the Court has 
focused on the interpretation of that legislation and on the review of 
statutory interpretations by administrative agencies. That the task of 
giving effect to statutory provisions in specific cases is vital is generally 
agreed, but getting consensus on a method of approach has proved more 
elusive.67 Jackson's record on this point'suggests that he preferred a 
narrow and literal construction of legislative acts, provided the result 
squared with the obvious intent of the legislature. It was his view that 
63 318 U.S. 371 at 403, 63 S.Ct. 636 (1943). 
64 339 U.S. 323 at 345-346, 70 S.Ct. 724 (1950). 
65 In the Bryan case, the Court distinguished its holding from that in Christoffel v. 
United States, 338 U.S. 84, 69 S.Ct. 1447 (1949). Jackson concurred in the result, but 
he felt that the Christoffel decision had been repudiated and should have been "forthrightly 
and artlessly" overruled. 
66 CARDozo, THE GROWTH oF nm LAw 143 (1924). 
67 See United States v. Henning, 344 U.S. 66 at 79, 73 S.Ct. 114 (1952), where 
Jackson posed the problem by quoting a revealing statement of Judge Learned Hand. 
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all other rules of statutory construction are subordinate to the doctrine 
"that courts will construe the details of an act in conformity with its 
dominating general purpose, will read the text in light of context and 
will interpret the text so far as the meaning of the words fairly permits 
so as to carry out in particular cases the generally expressed legislative 
policy."68 
That he believed it improper for the Court to add to or to take away 
from a statute by construction is apparent in United States 11. Walsh,69 
where he objected to the Court taking too many liberties in expanding 
the meaning of statutes. In Western Union Telegraph Co. 11. Lenroot7° 
he declared that "it is beyond the judicial power of innovation to supply 
a direct prohibition by construction. We think we should not try to 
reach the same result by a series of interpretations so far-fetched and 
forced as to bring into question the candor of Congress as well as the 
integrity of the interpretative process." To Jackson, it was beyond the 
fair range of interpretation to translate an Act of Congress "into an 
equivalent of the bills Congress rejected." 
In I.C.C. 11. Mechling71 Jackson criticized the Court for "legislating 
out" of the Transportation Act of 1940 two provisions included by Con-
gress. "Whether the Congressional law or the Court's amendments," 
he wrote, "are the better for the country is a complicated problem of 
policy which, in my conception of our judicial function, I am not privi-
leged to decide." In his last pronouncement on the subject, Jackson 
pointed out, "Judicial construction, constitutional or statutory, always 
is subject to hazards of judicial reconstruction. One may rely on today's 
narrow interpretation only at his peril, for some later Court may expand 
the Act to include, in accordance with its terms, what today the Court 
excludes."72 On the other hand, Jackson believed that statutory con-
struction should not be so strict as to defeat the obvious intent of the 
legislature, and that the Court should not "deflect what seems to be the 
course of practical and obvious justice" by resort to "metaphysical specu-
lations. "73 
as SEC v. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 at 350-351, 64 S.Ct. 120 (1943). 
69 331 U.S. 432, 67 S.Ct. 1283 (1947). In New York v. United States, 331 U.S. 
284, 67 S.Ct. 1207 (1947), Jackson favored a similar strict construction. 
10 323 U.S. 490 at 5.08, 65 S.Ct. 335 (1945). 
11330 U.S. 567 at 584, 67 S.Ct. 894 (1947). 
72United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 at 635, 74 S.Ct. 808 (1954). 
73 Pendergast v. United States, 317 U.S. 412 at 422, 63 S.Ct. 268 (1943). See also 
Jackson's dissents in United States ex rel. Marcus- v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 63 S.Ct. 379 
(1943), and United States v. Henning, 344 U.S. 66, 73 S.Ct. 114 (1952). In dissent in 
Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U.S. 611 at 635, 637, 68 S.Ct. 747 (1948), Jackson 
said that the majority's interpretation of the Social Security Act was "unnecessarily ruth• 
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Despite his general preference for a narrow and literal construction, 
Jackson did on occasion sanction broad statutory interpretations, as in 
Wickard v. Filburn,74 where he wrote the opinion for a unanimous 
Court sustaining the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. The hold-
ing of the case was the broadest to that time on the scope of congres-
sional power under the commerce clause and it suggested that limits to 
that power were almost non-existent. Admittedly, the chief point at 
issue was the constitutionality of the act itself, but to hold it constitu-
tional as applied to crops that would never leave the farm was hardly 
narrow construction.75 
Judicial Review and Constitutional Principles 
In its exercise of the judicial review function, the Court is con-
fronted with the necessity of interpreting the Constitution in three 
broad types of review situations: (1) enforcement of limitations arising 
out of the federal system, (2) enforcement of limitations arising out of 
separation of powers, including review of administrative agency de-
cisions, and (3) federal and state civil rights questions. The design of 
the present section is to examine Justice Jackson's views on these three 
!imitative concepts of the Constitution. 
less" and "so inconsistent with the purposes of the • • • Act that they could not have been 
intended by a reasonable Congress." 
Another controversial problem in the area of statutory interpretation concerns the value 
of a resort to legislative history as a guide in cases where the intent of Congress is not 
wholly clear from the words of the statute. In Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 
485 at 492, 67 S.Ct. 789 (1947), Jackson said that, in the absence of ambiguity in the 
statute, the Court should not resort to legislative history to determine its meaning. In 
United States v. Public Utilities Commission of California, 345 U.S. 295 at 319, 73 S.Ct. 
706 (1953), Jackson concurred in the result, but caustically scored the majority for its 
use of legislative history in support of its decision as amounting to a "psychoanalysis" of 
Congress rather than an analysis of the statute. "Never having been a Congressman," he 
said, "I am handicapped in that weird endeavor." · 
74 317 U.S. lll, 63 S.Ct. 82 (1942). 
7a In Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821, 65 S.Ct. 1545 (1945), Jackson protested 
against a narrow construction of the Sherman Act as applied to labor union activities. 
Another fundamental tenet of judicial review is that "not the wisdom or policy of 
legislation, but only the power of the legislature, is a fit subject for consideration by the 
courts." JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 81 (1941). This limitation 
is so basic to the restraint philosophy that Jackson seldom mentioned it specifically, but 
whenever he felt that the Court had speculated on the political factors that may have moti-
vated Congress his reaction was characteristically brusque. In De Zon v. American Presi-
dent Lines, Ltd., 318 U.S. 660, 63 S.Ct. 814 (1943), he said that whether the legislative 
policy was wise was "not for us to say." And in the Packard Motor Co. case he again 
warned the Court that the unwisdom of a statute was not adequate grounds for judicial 
veto. In Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 at 590, 72 S.Ct. 512 (1952), Jackson 
said, "Judicially we must tolerate what personally we may regard as a legislative mistake." 
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. Federalism. Is judicial strategy in the realm of federalism limited 
by the same rules of restraint that operate in other fields? In The 
Struggle for Judicial Supremacy Jackson said that the Constitution en-
trusted to the Court the preservation of the equilibrium of the Federal 
Union,76 and that the power to strike down state legislation that con-
llicts with the Constitution "rests on quite different foundations than 
does the power to strike down federal legislation as unconstitutional."77 
Despite this difference, state statutes were entitled to the same presump-
tion of constitutionality accorded federal statutes.78 In Jackson's view, 
any wise national system would create states if they did not already exist, 
and there is no place for hostility to the states or rivalry with them.79 
Not only are they necessary for local government purposes, but "the 
'insulated chambers of the states' are still laboratories where many les-
sons in regulation may be learned by trial and error on a small scale 
without involving a whole national industry in every experiment."80 
More instructive for present purposes, however, are Jackson's views on 
the operation of the restraint doctrine with respect to two important 
federalism issues that frequently confront the Court. 
The first of these issues concerns cases that come up on appeal from 
state courts. In Herb '17. Pitcairn81 Jackson explained why he regarded 
deference to state court determinations a sound judicial limitation. The 
reason, he said, is found in the partitioning of power between the state 
and federal judicial systems and in the limitations of the Court's own 
jurisdiction. He felt that the only power of the Court over state judg-
ments was "to correct them to the extent that they incorrectly adjudge 
federal rights," not to revise state court opinions. A year earlier, in 
Ashcra~ '17. Tennessee,82 Jackson declared that in determining issues of 
fact "respect for the sovereign character of the several states always has 
constrained this Court to give great weight to findings of fact of state 
courts."83 The Court, he added, should not lay down rules of evidence 
for them or revise their decisions merely because it felt more confidence 
76 JACKSON, THI! STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 9 (1941). 
77 Id. at 15. 
78 Jackson, in Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 64 S.Ct. 474 (1944). 
79 JACKSON, THI! STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 19 (1941). 
80 Connecticut Light and Power Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 515 at 530, 65 S.Ct. 749 
(1945). 
81324 U.S. 117, 65 S.Ct. 459 (1945). 
82 322 U.S. 143 at 157-158, 64 S.Ct. 921 (1944). 
83 In Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 at ·533, 73 S.Ct. 397 (1952), Jackson deplored 
the failure of federal judges to wield their power responsibly "according to lawyerly proce-
dures" and with "genuine respect _for state court fact finding." 
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in its own "wisdom and rectitude." In Stein v. New York,84 however, 
Jackson made clear that respect for state courts was not synonymous 
with abdication. The Court, he said, could not allow itself to be com-
pletely bound, "else federal law could be frustrated by distorted fact 
:finding." But in the event of "miscarriages of such gravity and magni-
tude that they cannot be expected to happen in an enlightened system 
of justice," the Court would intervene to review the weight of evidence 
supporting a state court decision.85 
A second type of federalism issue concerns state measures of tax-
ation and regulation that are alleged to interfere with interstate com-
merce, and to Justice Jackson this was one of the areas of judicial 
review that was not controlled by doctrines of judicial abstention or 
deference. To him, it was in the great tradition of the Court and one of 
its vital functions to prevent "local parasitic endeavors from pro:6ting 
at the expense of the nation's trade."86 In his £rst term on the Court, 
Jackson gave effect to this belief by joining in the Court's action in 
striking down a state law that unduly burdened interstate commerce.87 
In an opinion for the majority, Jackson observed that it was "a tempting 
escape from a difficult question to pass to Congress the responsibility 
for continued existence of local restraints and obstructions to national 
commerce." But since these restraints were "individually too petty, too 
diversi:6ed, and too local," to attract the attention of a hard-pressed 
Congress, the practical result was that in default of action by the Court 
the states "will go on suffocating and retarding and Balkanizing Ameri-
can commerce, trade and industry." The freshman justice then added 
a word of caution: "If the reaction of this Court against what many of 
us have regarded as an excessive judicial interference with legislative 
action is to yield wholesome results, we must be cautious lest we merely 
rush to other extremes."88 This was but the :first of the warnings against 
84 346 U.S. 156 at 181, 73 S.Ct. 1077 (1953). 
85 For Frankfurter's views on respect for state court determinations, see PRITCHETr, 
CIVII. WERTIES AND THE VINSON CotmT 213-215 (1954). 
86 JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 284 (1941). 
87 Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390 at 400-401, 62 S.Ct. 311 (1941). 
88 Id. at 401. Jackson elaborated on these views in a majority opinion in Hood & Sons 
v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 at 533, 539, 69 S.Ct. 657 (1949), where he admitted that the 
state could "shelter its people from menaces to their health or safety and from fraud," even 
when these dangers emanated from interstate commerce. But the states could not retard or 
obstruct the flow of commerce for their own economic advantage; such regulation could lead 
only to "fantastic rivalries and dislocations and reprisals." 
It is interesting to note that Jackson did not always rely on the commerce clause to 
prevent state restraints on interstate movement. In Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 62 
S.Ct. 164 (1941), the Court used the commerce clause to invalidate California's famous 
"Anti-Okie" laws, but Jackson, in a concurring opinion, advocated using the "privileges 
and immunities" clause instead. 
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extremism that were to become typical of Jackson in later years. In 
1949, he summarized succinctly his philosophy concerning state inter-
ference with commerce: "If it is interstate commerce that feels the 
pinch, it does not matter how local the operation which applies the 
squeeze."89 
Separation of Powers. Much of what has been said thus far lends 
support to the view that the doctrine of judicial restraint is largely a 
product of the system of separation of powers imposed by the Consti-
tution. Consequently, Jackson's views concerning separation of powers 
are basic to his conception of the judicial function. He expressed some 
of those ideas in numerous cases, 90 but he reserved his most compre-
hensive statement for the recent Steel Seizure Case.91 The case is too 
complex to review in detail here, but it is enough to point out that the 
question presented to the Court was whether, in an "emergency" sit-
uation, the President, independently of an express congressional grant 
of authority, had the power to seize certain steel mills threatened by a 
work stoppage, in order to prevent discontinuance of production. 92 
It has been suggested that a strict application of the restraint philos-
ophy would require avoiding the constitutional issue, 93 but the Court 
majority,94 Jackson included, elected otherwise and met the constitu-
tional issue four-square. This done, the doctrine of self-restraint dic-
tated a decision favorable to the President unless the case against him 
was clear beyond a reasonable doubt. Chief Justice Vinson, in dissent 
with Justices Reed and Minton, took this position. The President, he 
argued, had a choice of several statutory remedies, and that after ex-
89 United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Assn., 336 U.S. 460 at 464, 69 S.Ct. 
714 (1949). Another barometer revealing the extent of Jackson's willingness to apply 
stricter rules to state taxation and regulation cases is provided by Pritchett's statistical analy-
sis. Jackson participated in twenty of the thirty-seven non-unanimous cases in this area 
during the 1938 through 1946 terms. In state taxation cases he voted for the validity of 
the action in 50% of the cases, but in commerce cases he favored the state only 7% of the 
time. In contrast, the comparable figures for Justice Black were 100 and 88%, and for 
Justice Frankfurter 100 and 68%. PmTCHE'IT, THE RoosEVELT CouRT 89 (1948). 
90 See the cases involving political questions and presumption of constitutionality, 
cited above. See also Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S. 189, 69 S.Ct. 1453 (1949); Kedroff 
v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 73 S.Ct. 143 (1952); and the Waterman Steam-
ship Corp. [333 U.S. 103 (1948)] and Harisiades [343 U.S. 580 (1952)] cases. 
91 Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 72 S.Ct. 863 (1952). 
92 For a fuller discussion of the Steel Seizure Case, see CoRWIN, THE CoNsTlTUTION 
oF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, S. Doc. 170, 82d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 489-499 (1953). 
93 Paul A. Freund suggests what might have been done to avoid judicial intervention 
in "The Supreme Court, 1951 Term: Foreword, The Year of the Steel Case,'' 66 HARv. L. 
Rnv. 89 (1952). 
94 Justice Black wrote the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Frankfurter, Douglas, 
Jackson and Burton formally concurred. Justice Clark concurred in the judgment of the 
Court. 
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hausting the one chosen he was not exceeding his power by seizing 
the steel mills, especially since, as President T rurnan had explained, 
the action was a temporary expedient intended "only to save the situa-
tion until Congress could act." 
Justice Jackson, in a well-reasoned opinion concurring with the 
majority, rejected the dissenters' version of self-restraint and voted to 
invalidate the action of the President. In support of his decision, Jackson 
presented a modest, but thorough-going, interpretation of the complex 
doctrine of separation of powers that was in many respects superior to 
the interpretations of his fellow justices. To Jackson, an analysis of 
the President's powers could not be based on isolated clauses or even 
a single article removed from context. The Constitution, he said, "en-
joins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy 
but reciprocity," and the President's powers are "not :fixed, but Huctuate, 
depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Con-
gress."95 Jackson then pointed out that the Executive has only dele-
gated powers under a Constitution that has as its purpose "not only to 
grant power, but to keep it from getting out of hand." He did not 
advocate a niggardly construction of these powers; they should be given 
the scope and elasticity afforded by practical implications, instead of 
the "rigidity dictated by a doctrinaire textualism." But while the mili-
tary powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief were broad, they 
were not meant to "supersede representative government of internal 
affairs." The appeal to inherent or emergency powers, long "a persua-
sive dialectical weapon in political controversy," Jackson thought simi-
larly unwarranted by the Constitution. The executive power of the 
President is not a "grant in bulk of all conceivable executive powers 
thereinafter stated." In Jackson's opinion, the Constitution makes no 
provision for the exercise of extraordinary presidential authority because 
of a crisis. Moreover, the Constitution could not be "amended" by the 
courts to give the President inherent powers to meet an emergency. 
95 343 U.S. 579 at 635. At this point in his opinion, Jackson distinguished three 
practical situations in which the President might doubt, or others challenge, his power. 
First, when the President acts pursuant to an express or an implied authorization of Con-
gress, ''his authority is at a maximum," and there is a strong presumption of the validity 
of his action. The seizure did not meet this condition, because it was conceded no such 
congressional authorization existed. The second situation arises when the President acts 
in the absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority. In this situation, he 
can rely only on his own independent powers, but that did not apply in this case, since 
Congress had enacted several statutory policies inconsistent with the seizure. Thirdly, when 
the President takes measures incompatible with the express or implied will of Congress, his 
power is at its "lowest ebb." This, in Jackson's view, was the type of situation presented 
by the seizure. 
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With the office of President already powerful, Jackson did not see how 
it could be harmed if the Court refused to supplement it further. From 
this review it is apparent that Jackson had succeeded, in his own mind 
at least, in equating a decision circumscribing executive action with his 
belief in the efficacy of judicial restraint. It is equally apparent that, 
faced with a situation that prevented deference to both political 
branches simultaneously, Jackson would have the Court seek a solu-
tion that would preserve the equilibrium implicit in the doctrine of 
separation of powers. 
Another separation of powers issue concerns the extent to which 
the courts should review determinations by administrative agencies. 
While attorney general, Jackson argued that the courts should look 
upon these agencies not as interlopers but as partners in achieving the 
objectives set forth in the statutes.96 These fact-£nding tribunals, he 
contended, were created to perform diverse tasks for which the courts 
were ill-suited. If the two were to be partners, the courts should limit 
themselves to de£ning the scope of authority granted in the statute, to 
preventing arbitrary procedure, and to examining the record to ascer-
tain whether the evidence was adequate to sustain the agency's £ndings 
of fact. Otherwise, judicial deference meant bowing to the expertness 
of the agencies in economic and social matters and acceptance of their 
£ndings where sustained by the evidence. Jackson seemed to realize 
that refusal to grant a certain degree of £nality to their decisions would 
render administrative agencies superfluous or destroy their effectiveness. 
As an assqciate justice, Jackson did not substantially alter his earlier 
position.97 In 1942, in dissent in United States v. Carolina Freight 
Carriers Corp.,98 he said that the Court should not substitute its "own 
wisdom or unwisdom" for that of administrative officials who have not 
exceeded their powers. And in a 1944 case,99 he declared that the 
Court should not substitute inferences of its own for those drawn by 
the I.C.C.100 On the other hand, Jackson protested against excessive 
96 JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 267-268 (1941). 
97 For statistics suggesting that Jackson was more favorable to the I.C.C., and less 
favorable to the S.E.C., than to the other agencies, see PRITCHE'IT, THE RoosBVELT CounT 
190 (1948). 
98 315 U.S. 475 at 495, 62 S.Ct. 722 (1942). 
99 Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Ry. Co. v. United States, 322 U.S. 1, 
64 S.Ct. 842 (1944). 
100 Jackson expressed similar views in ICC v. Jersey City, 322 U.S. 503, 64 S.Ct. 1129 
(1944), and in Webre Steib Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 324 U.S. 164, 65 
S.Ct. 578 (1945). In New York v. United States, 331 U.S. 284 at 359, 67 S.Ct. 1207 
(1947), however, Jackson said he was unwilling to allow the ICC to reshape the national 
economy. 
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cooperation with administrative agencies. In the second Chenery 
case,1°1 where the Court sustained an S.E.C. order it had rejected 
earlier,1°2 an irritated Jackson said that the administrative process war-
ranted fostering as a good way of applying law in specialized fields, 
but that its effectiveness was threatened when it was used "as a method 
of dispensing with law in those fields."103 Obviously, Jackson's con-
ception of the partnership between court and agency would not leave 
the Court a silent or junior partner. This is decidedly less judicial 
restraint than that advocated by Justice Frankfurter in reviewing ad-
ministrative agency decisions. In a 1940 opinion, Frankfurter said 
that "Congress which creates and sustains these agencies must be 
trusted to correct whatever defects experience may reveal. Interference 
by the courts is not conducive to the development of habits of responsi-
bility in administrative agencies."104 
Civil Rights. Unquestionably, the most significant constitutional 
issues that confronted the Court during Jackson's incumbency were 
those relating to civil liberties, where the record of the Court demon-
strates that radically different judicial values operate.105 Hence, Jack-
son's conception of the judicial function as applied to civil liberties 
problems forms a vital part of his judicial philosophy. In The Struggle 
for Judicial Supremacy Jackson asserted that the presumption of validity 
which attached to legislative acts was "frankly reversed" in cases of 
interference with free speech and free assembly. By intervening here, 
the Court "restores the processes of democratic government; it does not 
disrupt them."106 In 1943, when the compulsory Hag-salute issue came 
up for the second time, in West Virginia v. Barnette,1°1 Jackson was 
given an opportunity to put his earlier views to the test, and he re-
sponded by writing an eloquent defense of freedom against legislative 
encroachment. In his opinion for the majority, Jackson declared that 
it was the very purpose of the Bill of Rights "to withdraw certain sub-
jects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond 
the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal prin-
ciples to be applied by the courts." It was a "commonplace" that sup-
101 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 67 S.Ct. 1575 (1947). 
102 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 63 S.Ct. 454 (1943). 
1os 332 U.S. 194 at 218. See also FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 64 
S.Ct. 281 (1944). 
104FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 at 146, 60 S.Ct. 437 (1940). 
105 For a detailed discussion of these issues, see the two works by Pritchett, cited in 
note 2 above. 
106 JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 285 (1941). 
101319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178 (1943). 
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pression of op1mon was constitutional only "when the expression 
presents a clear and present danger of action of a kind the state is 
empowered to prevent and punish." To sustain the compulsory Hag-
salute, Jackson continued, the Court was "required to say that a Bill 
of Rights which guards the individual's right to speak his own mind, 
left it open to public authorities to compel him to utter what is not in 
his mind:' Freedom to differ, he concluded, is not limited to things 
that do not matter much. The test of its substance is the "right to differ 
as to things that touch at the heart of the existing order." 
Although he gave unqualified support to the freedom of religion 
claims in the Barnette case, Jackson objected when the Court extended 
the protection of the Constitution to the secular activities of the Je-
hovah's Witnesses.108 In Prince v. Massachusetts1°9 he said that the 
basic difference of opinion revolved around "the method of establishing 
limitations which of necessity bound religious freedom." His own view 
was that the limits began to operate whenever religious activities began 
"to affect or collide with liberties of others or of the public." Money-
raising activities on a public scale are "Caesar's affairs" and may be 
regulated by the state; such cases do not even present issues of freedom 
of religion.110 
Jackson's sincere and realistic attempts to balance liberty and order 
in practice forced him into numerous other dissents from what he 
regarded as too absolutistic interpretations of First Amendment free-
doms. In T erminiello v. Chicago111 he sharply rebuked the Court for 
reversing the conviction of T erminiello for breach of peace. The Court, 
he said, seemed to regard liberty and order as enemies, and "to be of 
the view that we must forego order to achieve liberty." But the choice 
is not between order and liberty; it is ''between liberty with order and 
anarchy without either." There is a danger, he warned, "that, if the 
Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, 
it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact." 
Dissenting in Kunz v. New York112 Jackson again voiced concern for 
the ability of the local community to pres~rve order. Should emergen-
10s See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 63 S.Ct. 870 (1943); Martin v. 
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 63 S.Ct. 862 (1943); and Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 
157, 63 S.Ct. 877 (1943). 
100 321 U.S. 158 at 177, 64 S.Ct. 438 (1944). 
110 To Jackson, the local regulation of sound-trucks was also a police matter, rather 
than a problem of free speech. See Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 68 S.Ct. 1148 (1948), 
and Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 69 S.Ct. 448 (1949). 
111 337 U.S. 1 at 14, 37, 69 S.Ct. 894 (1949). 
112 340 U.S. 290, 71 S.Ct. 312 (1951). 
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cies arise on the streets and the situation threaten to get out of hand, 
he saw no reason why the police could not require a speaker, "even if 
within his rights, to yield his right temporarily to the greater interest 
of peace."113 
In the field of state criminal cases, two judicial values influenced 
Jackson's attitude. One of these, discussed above, is the deference he 
felt was due to the judgments of state courts; the second concerns his 
views on the relation between the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the guarantees of the Federal Bill of Rights. The 
traditional position has been that the "liberty" protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment due process clause against state action included the 
rights protected by the First Amendment against federal action, but 
that it did not include the rights guaranteed in the remainder of the Bill 
of Rights amendments.114 In 1947, in Adamson v. California,116 the 
Court, in a five to four decision, held that the due process clause did 
not draw all the rights of the Federal Bill of Rights under its protec-
tion.116 As a result of this ruling, the Court, in deciding state criminal 
cases, has to fall back on its conception of fundamental principles of 
liberty and justice. But why include the First if not the Fourth through 
Eighth Amendments? Even if historically sound, this position appears 
short on logic, and it seemed to bother Justice Jackson. In the Barnette 
and T erminiello cases, he did not object to the inclusion of the First 
Amendment guarantees, but in 1952, in Beauharnais v. Illinois,111 he 
deserted that position. Although he admitted that the Fourteenth 
Amendment was "enigmatic and abstruse," he was nonetheless con-
vinced that the "Fourteenth Amendment did not 'incorporate' the 
113 Id. at 301. In the opinion for the majority in Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 
250, 72 S.Ct. 725 (1952), Justice Frankfurter held that the Illinois legislature had reason-
able grounds to pass a group libel law. Justice Jackson, however, adopted the position that 
criminal libel laws were "consistent with the concept of ordered liberty," only if surrounded 
by adequate safeguards to prevent invasion of freedom of speech. Because he felt the law 
as applied to Beauhamais lacked these safeguards, Jackson dissented from the majority ruling. 
114For related cases, see Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 45 S.Ct. 625 (1925), 
and Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 58 S.Ct. 149 (1937). 
115 332 U.S. 46, 67 S.Ct. 1672 (1947). 
116 In his scholarly opinion in the Adamson case, Justice Frankfurter attacked as 
historically invalid the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Bill of 
Rights. Justice Black felt that ''history conclusively demonstrates" that the Fourteenth 
Amendment intended a full incorporation of the Bill of Rights. For evidence showing 
Black's position to be historically untenable, see Fairman, "Does the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding," and Morrison, " ••• The 
Judicial Understanding," 2 STANFORD L. REv. 5 and 140, respectively (1949). Professor 
Crosskey upholds Black's view in his POLITICS AND THE CoNsnTUTION IN THE HISTORY 
OP THE UNITllD STATES, vol. 2, 1381, n. 11 (1953). 
111 343 U.S. 250 at 288, 72 S.Ct. 725 (1952). 
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First," and that "the powers of Congress and of the States over this 
subject are not of the same dimensions .... " 
The extent of Jackson's deference to state court judgments in crim-
inal cases is best illustrated by the confession cases, where the chief 
problem has been to determine the point at vyhich the questioning of 
suspects becomes coercive. In Ashcra-ft 11. Tennessee118 Jackson con-
tended that interrogation per se is not an "outlaw," and that all ques-
tioning is inherently coercive. And in a 1949 case,119 he said that, if 
the right of interrogation be admitted, then the Court should leave to 
trial judges and juries to decide individual cases, unless they show some 
want of proper standards of decision. He did not think the Court 
should "increase the handicap on society."120 
Each of the preceding cases came to the Supreme Court on appeal 
from state court decisions and, as suggested, this is one type of case 
governed by the restraint doctrine, provided the states observed the 
standards embodied in the concept of ordered liberty. But what of 
federal legislation alleged to violate individual rights? In American 
Communications Association, C.I.O. 11. Douds,121 the Court sustained 
the "non-Communist affidavit" provision (section 9h) of the Taft-
Hartley Act, against claims that it violated the First Amendment. In 
his ~xcellent partial dissent, Justice Jackson reviewed at length the aims, 
methods, and nature of the Communist Party. From this, he concluded 
that Congress had reasonable grounds for requiring labor union offi-
cers to disclose membership in, or affiliation with, the Communist 
Party. But the additional requirement of section 9h, that labor union 
officers must swear that they do not believe in overthrow of govern-
ment by force or other illegal means, was a different matter. In Jack-
son's opinion, Congress had no power to proscribe any opinion or be-
lief "which has not manifested itself in any overt act." The law may 
lay hold of a citizen when he acts illegally, but "we must let his mind 
alone." 
In Dennis 11. United States122 Jackson concurred in a majority opin-
ion upholding the validity of the Smith Act of 1940 and of the convic-
tions under it of the eleven Communist leaders in New York. A full 
11s 322 U.S. 143, 64 S. Ct. 921 (1944). 
110 Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 69 S.Ct. 1347 (1949). 
120 Id. at 62. Since 1949, the balance on the Court has shifted closer to Jackson's 
views that society was being handicapped by the excessive protection given to criminals. 
See Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 72 S.Ct. 141 (1951), and Stroble v. California, 
343 U.S. 181, 72 S.Ct. 599 (1952). 
121339 U.S. 382, 70 S.Ct. 674 (1950). 
122 341 U.S. 494, 71 S.Ct. 857 (1951). 
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review cannot be attempted here, but the case is important for the clues 
it offers concerning Jackson's civil rights philosophy, particularly with 
respect to the "clear and present danger" doctrine. That test for decid-
ing free speech cases was £rst announced by Justice Holmes in 1919123 
and was embraced whole-heartedly by the liberal Court after 1937. In 
1943, in the Barnette case, Jackson called the clear and present danger 
test a "commonplace," but he emphasized that it meant that suppres-
sion of opinion is tolerated only when the speech creates a clear and 
present danger "of action of a kind the State is empowered to prevent 
and punish."124 The failure of the majority to apply the latter half of 
the doctrine in later cases began to disturb Jackson. In the Terminiello 
case, he argued that the Court had not only abandoned the correct use 
of the clear and present danger test, but the "fighting words" concept 
of the Chaplinsky case125 as well, and had replaced them with "a dogma 
of absolute freedom for irresponsible and provocative utterance .... "126 
Shortly before the Dennis case, in Kunz v. New York,1 21 Jackson 
rejected altogether the application of the clear and present danger 
doctrine and advocated using the "fighting words" concept instead. 
In his concurring opinion in the Dennis case, Jackson said that the 
"clear and present danger" test was an "innovation" by Justice Holmes 
for use in cases arising before the "subtlety and efficacy of modernized 
revolutionary techniques" had been revealed. It was "a test for the 
sufficiency of evidence in particular cases," which Jackson said he would 
save "for application as a 'rule of reason' in the kind of case for which 
it was devised." This included "hot-headed speech on a street comer, 
or circulation of a few incendiary pamphlets ... or refusal of a handful 
of school children to salute our flag." But he felt that the approach to 
the problem of a nationwide and well-organized conspiracy had to be 
more realistic. No doctrine could be sound that would require the 
Court to make prophecies about the probability of success of the Com-
munist movement. The judicial process "simply is not adequate to a 
trial of such far-flung issues. The answers given would reflect our own 
123 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 at 52, 39 S.Ct. 247 (1919). There Holmes 
said: "The question in every case is whether the words us!ld are used in such circumstances 
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about 
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." 
124 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 at 633, 63 S.Ct. 
1178 (1943). Italics added. 
125 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766 (1942). 
126 Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 at 28, 69 S.Ct. 894 (1949). 
121 340 U.S. 290, 71 S.Ct. 312 (1951). 
• 
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political predilections and nothing more." The clear and present danger 
test, then, was inappropriate for cases of this kind.128 
In cases involving aliens, the restraint philosophy, as Jackson 
pointed out in the Harisiades case, requires a presumption in favor of 
the political branches. But Jackson did not permit his deference to 
legislative and administrative policy to produce harsh or absurd results. 
When the Court upheld the exclusion, without hearing, of Ellen 
Knauff on the ground that her admission would be prejudicial to the 
interests of the United States, Jackson dissented.129 In protesting the 
action of the attorney general, Jackson said he did not feel Congress 
had meant to authorize the "abrupt and brutal exclusion of the wife 
of an American citizen without a hearing." The Mezei case130 was 
not too dissimilar, except that, after the exclusion order, Mezei had 
been unable to gain admission elsewhere and had remained in deten-
tion for twenty-one months. The lower courts had ordered release 
through a habeas corpus proceeding, but the Supreme Court reversed. 
In dissent, Jackson admitted the right of administrative detention, but 
to detain an alien without a hearing or fair notice of charges was a 
denial of due process of law. 
In federal criminal prosecutions, the chief source of judicial dis-
agreement has been the searches and seizures provision of the Fourth 
Amendment, and some unusual alignments have resulted.131 Justic~ 
Black and Douglas, for example, are often unmoved by civil liberties 
claims arising under the Fourth Amendment, while Jackson's sensi-
tiveness on that score virtually elevated protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures to a "preferred position." In the light of his views 
on state law enforcement, Jackson's position on Fourth Amendment 
cases is a little difficult to fathom. But, as he reasoned in United States 
v. Di Re,132 the forefathers designed our Constitution "to place obsta-
cles in the way of a too permeating police surveillance, which they 
seemed to think was a greater danger to a free people than the escape 
of some criminals from punishment."133 
Although brief, this review of civil liberties cases discloses that 
Justice Jackson was neither doctrinaire nor extremist in his views. He 
12s Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 at 567-570, 71 S.Ct. 857 (1951). Since 
the statute outlawed conspiracy, Jackson thought the law of conspiracy appropriate for cases 
of this kind. 
129 United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 70 S.Ct. 309 (1950). 
130 Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 73 S.Ct. 625 (1953). 
131 See Table XVII in PmTcHE'IT, THE RoosBVELT CotmT 141 (1948). 
132 332 U.S. 581, 68 S.Ct. 222 (1948). 
13a Id. at 595. See also Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 67 S.Ct. 1098 (1947). 
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believed that the Court's day to day task was "to reject as false, claims 
in the name of civil liberty which, if granted, would paralyze or impair 
authority to defend existence of our society, and to reject as false, claims 
in the name of security which would undermine our freedoms and open 
the way to oppression."134 Neither a mechanical application of the 
preferred status doctrine nor an indefensible hostility to individual 
rights would do. And a Court governed by this sense of self-restraint, 
Jackson contended, "does not thereby become paralyzed. It simply 
conserves its strength to strike more telling blows in the cause of a 
working democracy."135 
The Court and the Living Constitution 
When Jackson became an associate justice in 1941, the Court had 
already worked out the "corrected pattern of self-restraint'' proved so 
necessary by the constitutional history of the preceding decade. The 
"struggle for judicial supremacy" had entered a new era. With the war 
and its aftermath came new conditions, so that today the fundamental 
question has become: what should be the role of the Supreme Court 
and judicial review in a democratic nation functioning under "cold war" 
conditions? A justice's answer to that question is in large measure the 
sum of his judicial philosophy. To those firmly convinced of the anti-
democratic character of judicial review, the answer might be that the 
restraint philosophy logically requires judicial abdication in favor of 
majority rule. Others, such as Charles P. Curtis, contend that the 
function of the Court is to "interpret for us and declare to us the im-
manent component in our constitutional law ... [and] to mediate 
between this immanent component and the other component which 
is imposed upon us by the rule of a sometimes hasty, occasionally hys-
terical, and too often selfish majority."136 A Court actuated solely by 
the restraint doctrine is patently incapable of playing this statesmanlike 
role advocated by Curtis. What was Justice Jackson's conception of 
the utlimate role of the Supreme Court in the middle of the twentieth 
century? 
In The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy Jackson said he recognized 
"that constitutional law is not a fixed body of immutable doctrine."137 
134 American Communications Association, C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 at 445, 70 
S.Ct. 674 (1950). 
135 JACKSON, THB STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 285 (1941). 
136 Cmtis, "Review and Majority Rule," in CAHN, Su.PREME CounT AND SUPRl!ME 
LAW 184 (1954). 
137 JACKSON, THB STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SuPREMAcY, xiv (1941). 
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He felt then that it was the right of his generation "consciously to 
influence the evolutionary process of constitutional law, as other gen-
erations had done."138 And future generations should give the prece-
dents of his time "only the respect due to the deeds of men who with 
earnest heart and troubled mind have sought gropingly but honestly 
for what was best for their day."139 
During his tenure on the Court, particularly in later years, Jackson 
continued to search with a troubled mind for what was best for the 
times. To him, there were hosts of compelling reasons for exercising 
the judicial review function with restraint and caution, but he did not 
permit his respect for the political branches to become judicial abdica-
tion. There were still relevant and vital tasks to be performed by the 
Court in composing conflicts arising out of the federal system, separa-
tion of powers, and the relations between the government and its 
citizens. The notion that the Court should abdicate its function in 
preserving these equilibriums was unacceptable to Jackson. That he 
frequently refused to defer to the political branches is clearly evident 
in the cases involving state interference with interstate commerce, in 
the Steel Seizure Case, and in numerous cases in the :field of civil 
liberties. His insistence on the validity of judicial restraint has alien-
ated some, but his application of the doctrine was less dogmatic than 
that of Justice Frankfurter. 
· On the other hand, Jackson objected vigorously to the activist's 
unconcern for :fixed principles and for "lawyerly procedures." In 
Brown v. Allen140 he criticized "ad hoc determination of due process of 
law issues by personal notions of justice instead of by known rules of 
law." He admitted that considerable uncertainty was inherent in 
decisions which purport to interpret "cryptic and vagrant" constitu-
tional provisions, but he thought it regrettable that interpretation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment had become "more or less swayed by 
contemporary intellectual fashions and political currents." 
But what of those parts of the Constitution, such as the establish-
ment of religion clause, where the legal propositions are less concrete 
than procedural due process? In his concurring opinion in the Mc-
Collum case, Jackson admitted that these imprecise. propositions pre-
sented greater problems. "It is idle to pretend," he said, "that this task 
is one for which we can :find in the Constitution one word to help us 
as judges to decide where the secular ends and the sectarian begins in 
13s Ibid. ,,, 
130 Id. at xvi. 
140 344 U.S. 443 at 532, 73 S.Ct. 437 (1953). 
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education .... It is a matter on which we can :6.nd no law but our own 
prepossessions." In objecting to the sweeping nature of the Court's 
holding, Jackson's own prepossessions induced him to attempt to bal-
ance the equities of the situation. In his opinion, the Court should 
"leave some flexibility to meet local conditions, some chance to progress 
by trial and error," and not lay down a rigid, "unchanging standard for 
countless school boards."141 This effort to avoid extremes and to work 
out pragmatically solutions for problems as they are presented to the 
Court suggests that moderation lay at the heart of Jackson's judicial 
philosophy. 
Conclusions 
The most striking feature of Justice Jackson's judicial philosophy is 
that it can only with great difficulty be made to conform to any of the 
neat and currently-popular classi:6.cations of Supreme Court justices. 
There is considerable evidence that Jackson was, along with Frank-
furter, a strong supporter of judicial self-restraint. But conclusions 
drawn from this must of necessity be tempered by substantial evidence 
to the contrary, for his reaction to some classes of cases was distinctly 
"activist." The view that he was a conservative has to gloss over his 
many liberal opinions; while the charge that he was anti-libertarian 
cannot be sustained, if by that it is meant to suggest he was fundamen-
tally hostile to the rights of individuals. To classify him as "less-liber-
tarian" is to ignore the complex of factors that color the adjudication 
of most civil rights claims that get as far as the Supreme Court. Fortu-
nately, the dilemma is more seeming than real. The way out is to aban-
don attempts to squeeze the justices into these deceptively precise 
categories. 
Jackson was an advocate of caution and prudence in the exercise 
of the judicial review function, but he was decidedly not a doctrinaire 
crusader. His approach to the international Communist conspiracy, 
to problems of law enforcement, and to civil liberties was pragmatic, 
clear-headed and realistic. Through it all, he rarely permitted himself 
to forget his conception of the obligations that weighed on him as a 
judge. His genuine efforts to compose the conflicting claims of liberty 
and order, his deference to the political branches ( when warranted by 
the facts), and his deference to state courts (imposed by his notions as 
to the nature of federalism) often made him appear less-libertarian than 
141 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 at 237-238, 68 
S.Ct. 461 (1948). 
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Justices Black and Douglas. But his concern_ was more for the facts 
of a case than for a decision that might give results pleasing to him. 
The classification of Supreme Court justices as advocates of either 
judicial activism or judicial restraint, and the use of statistical devices 
to facilitate the process, can be a helpful approach to some problems of 
constitutional law. But it is inadequate to the task of determining the 
judicial philosophy of a particular justice. Jackson, for one, cannot be 
so readily pigeonholed. The statistical devices usually unveil him as 
both a conservative and an advocate of self-restraint; yet when all is 
said that such devices can say, Jackson remains erratic and unpredict-
able to the disconcerted score-keeper. But why should unpredictability 
be suspect? In times of overshadowing change, a justice can ill-afford 
to champion a single, inRexible set of values. If Jackson's judicial 
philosophy was not always fully integrated and consistent, if he some-
times expressed uncertainty about the best way to apply the constitu-
tional law of a free society, one can feel much sympathy for him. Only 
the ideologist has ready-made solutions for novel and complex problems. 
To maintain with Justice Jackson that the Court should restrain 
itself rather than engage in affirmative policy creation is not to assign 
the Court a lesser role. Just as Congress is probably at its best when 
it succeeds in achieving an equilibrium of conflicting interests, so may 
the Court be at its £nest when it preserves the equilibriums of our 
system of government. Perhaps this is the highest judicial statesman-
ship. If this be so, then membership -on the Court calls for a sense of 
sober responsibility, humility of judgment, and moderation of view-
point. Justice Jackson's judicial career demonstrates that he possessed 
all of these qualities. 
